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In the early decades of the contemporary world economy, Portugal had to perform twice difficult 
stabilization processes: during the 1890s as a consequence of the collapse of external and public 
debt payments, and during the 1920s in the wake of the First World War. This paper will analyse 
these Portuguese situations: the 1890s stabilization based on leaving the gold-standard monetary 
system and on partial default of the external public debt payments led to a period of economic 
stagnation, which lasted until the First World War, in spite of the good international background 
provided by the so-called belle époque; the 1920s stabilization based on a very tough fiscal 
adjustment opened the way to an interwar period of slight growth, in spite of the unfavourable 
international background provided by the problems of the 1920s and the Great Depression during 
the 1930s (although it was not enough to sustain the liberal republican regime, which was replaced 
by a military dictatorship, and later an authoritarian right-wing regime). 
The organization of the paper is straightforward: section 2 deals with the early 1890s crisis and 
the stabilization that followed; section 3 deals with the problems caused by the First World War and 
the stabilization that followed. The last section attempts to draw some lessons concerning the 
behaviour of the Portuguese economy and society in stabilization processes. 
 
 
2. The early 1890s crisis and its aftermath 
 
2.1. The roots of the crisis 
 
Between the 1860s and the 1890s, the Portuguese economy performed rather well in a 
European and World context. During the 1860s, 1870s and 1880s, the rate of growth of per capita 
gross domestic product averaged around 1% per year, and the country acquired the basic 
infrastructure and institutional framework of a 19th century modern economy, namely railway and 
telegraph network, port and submarine cable equipment, gold standard monetary regime, moderate 
tariff and other barriers to foreign trade.2 
However, such a good performance was mixed with some structural problems that proved fatal 
in the long run to an effective take-off of the Portuguese economy into modern economic growth. 
Trade presented a permanent negative balance. This trade deficit was financed mainly by 
                                                      
1 Paper presented to the UECE Conference on “Economic and Financial Adjustments in Europe”, ISEG: Lisbon, 2012. 







emigrantsʼ remittances3 coming especially from Brazil, the main outlet of Portuguese emigration. 
Foreign capital also contributed to balancing the overall balance of payments. This includes 
purchase of government bonds, foreign direct investment (which contributed to the development of 
several important modern activities in the Portuguese economy, in the mining, manufacturing and 
services sectors), and portfolio investment. The point is that all these balancing items were rather 
volatile. As a consequence, Portuguese foreign payments were always under threat of strained 
situations. Second, public deficits remained permanent and, as a consequence, public debt 
accumulated until it reached levels that implied that the reputation of Portugal in international capital 
markets was already faltering in the late 1880s.4 Last but not least, human capital formation lagged 
behind physical capital formation. By the late 19th century, illiteracy rates (still of the order of three 
quarters of the adult population) and formal education (averaging less than one year for the active 
labour population) put a significant brake on Portuguese economic capabilities, and school 
enrolment (still below half of the young age groups) suggested a not very bright picture for the 
future. 
These fragilities of the Portuguese situation translated into short-term problems in the late 
1880s. These started with political upheavals in Brazil with the abolition of slavery (1888), followed 
by the proclamation of the republican regime (1889), which did not stabilize until the early 1890s. 
The ensuing reduction of emigrantsʼ remittances stressed the Portuguese balance of payments. The 
usual response would be a call for help from the financial place of London, especially from the 
Baring Brothers banking house, the Portuguese government banker in London and traditional 
provider of financial support at critical moments. Unfortunately, Baring Brothers was living its own 
difficulties, which had their roots in the collapse of its Argentinean endeavours. Thus, the so-called 
Baring crisis prevented Baring Brothers to come to the rescue of the Portuguese economy and 
government.5 1890 witnessed the first problems in one of the largest Portuguese banks, Montepio 
Geral, and by May 1891, the whole banking system was facing a bank run. 
Economic and financial problems were compounded by political problems, both external and 
internal. The external political problems were related with a conflict with Great Britain over the 
occupation of the interior of Southern Africa (the territories that form today Malawi, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and part of Mozambique). Portuguese attempts to control those regions were thwarted by 
a British ultimatum (11 January 1890) demanding the withdrawal of Portuguese expeditionary 
                                                      
3 Notice that technically what at the time was called emigrants’ remittances included three different items: capital revenue 
of returned emigrants; true emigrants’ remittances; and capital movements accompanying returning emigrants. 
4 According to Flandreau, Zummer, 2004 and Esteves, 2005, Crédit Lyonnais in 1888 regarded the Portuguese economy 
as high risk and the 1889 edition of Fenn's Compendium of the English and Foreign Funds positioned the Portuguese 
economy in fifth, among the twenty-three states addressed, in the indicator debt per capita. See also Valério, 1986 and 
Marinheiro, 2006. 







forces, and the ensuing division was quite unfavourable to Portuguese ambitions, as might be 
expected. Most of the territories under dispute became British possessions. Portugal had to content 
itself with the southern part of what was then called Nyasaland, from then on included in 
Mozambique (Northern Nyasaland became what is now Malawi). The internal political problems 
were mainly the consequence of a failed revolutionary attempt by Republican forces to profit from 
the loss of prestige of the monarchy resulting from the unfavourable solution of the conflict with 
Great Britain (31 January 1891).  
 
 
2.2. The responses to the crisis 
 
The Portuguese crisis of 1891 may be classified as a third generation crisis according the 
typology of Michael Bordo (2008).6 This category of crises involves an exchange crisis, plus a debt 
and banking crisis. 
The immediate response to the May 1891 bank run was a two-month moratorium (decreed on 7 
May), which implied the provisional suspension of gold convertibility of the banknotes in circulation. 
It was impossible to restore the conditions to resume convertibility during the two-month period, and 
on 9 July 1891 the suspension of gold convertibility of the banknotes in circulation was extended 
sine die. This allowed the intervention of Bank of Portugal as a lender of last resort for the banking 
system and the monetization of public deficits, with the corresponding banknote issuing. Thus, 
short-term internal problems were solved, although some banks had to shut down their activities 
(the main one was the Banco Lusitano, one of the largest banks of Lisbon) and others had to 
overcome difficulties with mergers (these mergers occurred mainly among banks of Porto).7 
External payments were another matter. Short-term support from international capital markets 
was needed. However, these markets contracted due to the international crisis, and the Baring 
Brothers, the traditional London bankers of the Portuguese government, were in an especially bad 
position, as explained above. As a consequence, instead of providing fresh funds, they had to call 
for reimbursement of 1 million pounds sterling, leading to a significant reduction of the gold reserves 
of the Bank of Portugal.8 As early as January 1891, the discount rate rose to 6%, as an attempt to 
play the rules of the gold-standard, but this move failed to stem further gold outflows. An attempt to 
compensate these problems by means of a long-term loan guaranteed by the tobacco monopoly 
met with understandable little success in Paris. 
                                                      
6 See also, Eichengreen and Portes, 1987; Eichengreen, 2002. 
7 On the banking situation of the period, see Valério et alii, 2006-2011. 







Roughly one year later, the lack of foreign exchange prevented the regular payment of external 
public debt. In June 1892, amortization was suspended, and interest payments were reduced to one 
third of contractual levels.9 
Such short-term moves alleviated the stress, but provided no long-term responses to the 
question of keeping the Portuguese economy in a development track.10 As public investment was no 
longer able to give the stimuli of the previous decades, there was a call for new ideas. Protectionism 
and colonial endeavours were the answers. In 1892 specific tariffs were raised and quantitative 
restrictions and import licensing schemes were established associated to schemes of imperial 
preference among Portugal and its colonial empire.11 Higher tariffs stimulated the growth of some 
sectors of the Portuguese economy (textiles were the main industrial branch to react to this tariff 
changes and increased its production for the colonial markets), but it is doubtful if the impact was a 
positive one in the long run. Colonial endeavours needed significant initial capital investments that 
the Portuguese economy was unable to provide. Thus, either foreign capital was allowed to take 
most of the benefits, or the vast colonial territories Portugal was, in spite of all humiliations, able to 
secure during the scramble for Africa would remain for long barren. Half-hearted acceptance of 
foreign capital into Portuguese colonies created a mixed situation for the following decades. 
As it was, economic stagnation characterized the Portuguese economic life for a long period 
after the debacle of the early 1890s. Both short-term and long-term explanations may put forward 
for such an evolution. The short-term solutions to the crisis of the early 1890s – exchange rate 
depreciation and partial debt default – put Portugal away from international capital markets for a 
long time, and made it very difficult to find financing for the type of public projects that had 
stimulated Portuguese growth during the preceding decades. Of the long-term solutions to the crisis 
of the early 1890s, one – protectionism – was quite detrimental to long-term performance of the 
Portuguese economy, because it is very hard for a rather small economy to develop closing itself to 
the international economy; the other – colonial endeavours – proved quite ineffective, because of 
lack of resources for colonial investment.  
 
 
                                                      
9 Foreign boldholders were given the possibility of converting their bonds into internal bonds, which were not subject to 
the same partial default. However, the overwhelming majority of the creditors did not accept, as might be expected. 
10 On the development policies in Portugal in the second half of the 19th century, see Mata, 1988. 







2.3. Fiscal adjustment and economic stagnation 
 
The dream of restoring monetary and financial normalcy never disappeared in Portugal until the 
outbreak of the First World War. Such a restoration implied an agreement with foreign bondholders 
and resuming banknote convertibility.12 
The agreement with foreign bondholders was finally reached in 1902. As might be expected, 
the clauses were half way between original contractual clauses and the situation imposed by the 
Portuguese government in 1892. Amortization was resumed with longer delays (it was concluded as 
scheduled in 2001) and interest was reduced to two-thirds of original contractual levels. However, 
this agreement did not reopen foreign capital markets to Portuguese issues (although private foreign 
direct investment remained an important item of Portuguese economic life for the following 
decades).13 
As a consequence, resuming banknote convertibility implied a decisive fiscal adjustment, so 
that public deficits (and their monetization) might disappear, public debt at the Bank of Portugal 
might be paid, and the reserves of the issuing bank might be restored. 
In a certain sense, the fiscal adjustment began already in 1892, by means of several tax 
increases, including a rise of the tax on the interest of internal public debt from 3% to 30%.14 During 
the following years, public deficits were significantly reduced (partly as a result of the reduction of 
payments related to the external public debt), but proved very difficult to eradicate, because the 
monarchic governments feared the social upheavals that might result from energetic fiscal 
measures (and republican opposition). Only on the eve of the First World War (after the Republican 
takeover on 5 October 1910, which allowed a tax reform, with tax increases falling mainly on the 
class of landowners, who mostly supported the monarchic regime) was it possible to achieve 
systematic surpluses in public accounts. Too late for the following steps for the definitive 
stabilization mechanism to be performed before the war swept away all hopes of normal life for all 
European countries, at least for the duration of the conflict. 
 
 
                                                      
12 Bordo, Schwartz, 1996. 
13 The next significant loan of the Portuguese government in foreign markets only occurred in the 1960s to finance the 
building of the first bridge over the Tagus in Lisbon. 







3. The 1920s problems and stabilization 
 
3.1. The First World War 
 
Portugal participated in the First World War as an informal belligerent between August 1914 
and March 1916 (border incidents in Southern Angola and Northern Mozambique with German 
troops respectively from South-West Africa and Tanganyika) and as a formal belligerent between 
March 1916 (declaration of war by Germany because Portugal refused to guarantee that German 
ships impounded in Portuguese ports would not be ceded to German enemies, that is to say, Great 
Britain, as eventually happened) and November 1918 (besides submarine war in the Atlantic and 
marches and counter marches of Portuguese and German troops between Mozambique and 
Tanganyika, a Portuguese expeditionary force was sent to Flanders and manned a section of the 
Western Front until it was crushed in the battle of La Lys on 9 April 1918).15 
Fiscal consequences of Portuguese participation in the First World War were higher 
expenditure for military purposes and increased control of several sectors of economic activity, just 
like in the other European belligerents. Higher expenditure was financed mainly by borrowing at the 
Bank of Portugal for internal expenditure and at the Bank of England for external expenditure. 
Monetary consequences of Portuguese participation in the First World War were the expansion 
of monetary supply, as the Bank of Portugal issued fresh notes to provide loans to the government; 
the rise of the price level, as the additional money supply faced decreased commodities supplies, 
both because of difficulties of maintaining external supplies as a result of the situation of war itself 
and because of the reduction of domestic economic activity, partly as a result of the default of 
foreign supplies of crucial commodities, partly as a result of mobilization of domestic resources for 
military purposes; and the depreciation of the exchange rate, although moderate, as the balance of 
payments remained negative, but transactions were reduced by the state of war. 
 
 
3.2. The immediate post-war 
 
In Portugal, as in Europe and America in general, there was in the immediate post-war years 
the wish to return to the economic conditions of the immediate pre-war years. However, in Portugal, 
as in Europe and America in general, the fundamentals of the economy had been so deeply 
changed, that such an evolution was completely impossible. 
                                                      







In the fiscal domain it proved impossible to restore a balanced budget by reducing expenditure 
and maintaining revenue. As a matter of fact, the reduction of military and economic expenditure 
was slow, and old fiscal laws were unable to raise the same proportion of revenue to the gross 
domestic product than on the eve of the First World War. As a consequence, public deficits 
remained rather high for a few years after the end of the war, and the government went on 
borrowing at the Bank of Portugal, with unavoidable inflationary consequences, in spite of the 
restoration of the normal supply of foreign commodities and the recovery of domestic economic 
activity. 
War expenditure abroad (mainly for armaments and supplying the expeditionary force in 
Flanders) generated a war debt towards Great Britain (as a result of borrowing at the Bank of 
England) of nearly 20 million pounds (an increase of outstanding external public debt by nearly a 
half). It proved impossible to pay this debt within the agreed delay (two years after the end of the 
war), because international capital markets were out of question for the Portuguese government. 
This eventually led to an increase of the outstanding amount of around 5 million pounds due to 
unpaid interest. 
As most European winners, Portugal tried to recover war costs by demanding war reparations 
from Germany. The Portuguese final slice amounted to nearly 1 billion gold marks equivalent to 
nearly 50 million pounds. This was enough to pay war debts and a significant part of other foreign 
public debt, but payments were meagre as a consequence of well-known disputes between the 
countries involved.16 
The main distortion introduced by the evolution during the war years was the gap between 
internal and external depreciation of the monetary unit. While the internal value of the monetary unit 
was one third of the pre-war level, as prices had roughly trebled, the external value of the monetary 
unit was 56% less than the pre-war level, as depreciation had been rather moderate. As the price 
level in the main Portuguese trade partner, Great Britain, tended to come back to pre-war levels, 
Portuguese exports faced a rather unfavourable competitivity situation. As might be expected, the 
market trend was towards further depreciation of the Portuguese currency, and no exchange control 
measures were able to stem the tide. After some time, depreciation overtook the price level increase 
and fed back into internal inflation. 
As might be expected, this period was characterized by political instability. Short-lived 
governments and a few military coups made impossible any drive towards fiscal consolidation. 
To sum up: slow fiscal consolidation, uncertainty about war debt and reparations payments and 
an unfavourable competitivity situation triggered an exchange debacle, which fed back into 
                                                      







increased internal inflation. For a few years after the end of the war, Portugal seemed on the verge 
of a hyper-inflationary process. 
 
 
3.3. From fiscal reform to formal monetary stabilization: economic and financial success  
       and political upheavals 
 
The first step towards redressing the situation was the 1922 fiscal reform.17 Profiting from some 
political stabilization under a government of the Democratic Party, a complete revision of the fiscal 
regime allowed the restoration of the pre-war levels of the ratio between fiscal revenue and the 
gross domestic product, and attempted to reach a more modern technique of tax rising and a more 
balanced distribution of the fiscal burden. The 1922 fiscal reform was supplemented by a new 
protectionist tariff in 1923.18 As a consequence, there was a gradual reduction of public deficit, and 
from 1923 onwards the government no longer needed to borrow significant sums at the Bank of 
Portugal. 
However, the exchange depreciation and the increase of prices went on until the summer of 
1924. By then, the exchange rate was more than thirty times higher and prices were around twenty-
four times higher than before the war. Meanwhile, the government had mobilized significant 
amounts of foreign exchange, partly by selling demonetized silver in the London market, partly by 
forcing exporters to sell to the Bank of Portugal at least half of the foreign exchange they obtained 
by means of surtax on exports paid back against the selling of the exchange. An energetic 
intervention in the market using the foreign exchange thus accumulated did the trick. Exchange 
depreciation stopped, price increases stopped, and the exchange rate tended to align rather quickly 
with the price level at twenty-four times the pre-war levels. Of course, the Portuguese stabilization 
profited from the general stabilization in Europe, after the end of German hyperinflation and the 
approval of the Dawes Plan on the payment of war reparations, which occurred also in 1924. 
The change in monetary conditions in Portugal had short-term recessive effects, although the 
levels of economic activity did not show any significant decrease. Together with discontent among 
wealthy classes about the 1922 fiscal reform, this prevented the republican regime and the 
Democratic Party to translate the success in setting the basis for economic and financial 
stabilization into a political success. By the end of May 1926 they had been replaced by a military 
dictatorship. 
                                                      
17 Valério (coord.), 2001. 
18 To avoid specific duties from being thwarted by price increases, payment of duties was demanded in gold, that is to      







The new military government did not modify the main elements of the fiscal and monetary policy 
of the late republican governments. The only bit of backpedalling was the announcement of a new 
fiscal reform, to alleviate the shortcomings of 1922 reform according to the wealthy classes. This 
was prepared by a committee headed by Oliveira Salazar, professor of Public Finance at the 
University of Coimbra, a man to be heard of again. Moreover, an agreement with Great Britain was 
reached to settle the war debt in sixty-three instalments until 1988; and an attempt was made to 
raise a foreign loan to consolidate the stabilization by adopting the gold-exchange-standard 
monetary regime. 
The first round to try to get the foreign loan at the place of London in 1927 failed because 
potential lenders suggested the back-up of the League of Nations in a way similar to the one already 
adopted for several European countries (namely Austria, Hungary, Greece and Bulgaria).19 
Negotiations with the League of Nations also failed in early 1928 because the Portuguese 
government though unwise to accept the control conditions demanded by the League for political 
reasons. These failures brought down the military group that had managed Portuguese finances for 
two years after the 1926 coup. In April 1928 the civilian Oliveira Salazar became Minister of Finance 
of the military government. 
The situation Salazar found was rather favourable. Public accounts were well in the way of 
balancing and the exchange rate and prices were structurally stable in spite of the short-term 
disturbances caused by the failure of the London and Geneva negotiations. A last round of 
negotiations with London bankers convinced Salazar that the foreign loan was a mirage. Balancing 
public accounts to confirm the will to stabilize (1928), and implementing the new fiscal reform he 
had prepared to satisfy the supporters of the new situation from a political point of view (1929) was 
all that could be done immediately. Three years later formal stabilization seemed possible. On the 
1st of July 1931, convertibility of the Portuguese escudo was restored (by means of indirect 
convertibility into the pound sterling) at a level roughly twenty-four times lower than the pre-war 
one.20 
By then, Salazar had already made the decisive steps to become the true leader of the new 
political regime, building on the prestige resulting from his supposed role as the man who brought 
order to the Portuguese finances, in contrast with the disorder of the republican and early military 
governments. Although completely false, the propaganda worked. By July 1932 Salazar was the 
civilian head of the military government (!), and by April 1933 the new right-wing authoritarian 
regime, the New State [Estado Novo], was established according to the Constitution drafted by 
Salazar. 
                                                      
19 Cf. Eichengreen, 1996. 







3.4. The good 1930s 
 
Meanwhile, the world had plunged into the depths of the Great Depression (and the Hoover 
moratorium and the suspension of payments related to war debts and reparations resulting from the 
Lausanne Conference had relieved Portugal from war debt payments; of course, German 
reparations under the revised Young Plan had also ceased). The Portuguese response to the Great 
Depression was rather classical in its design: curbing consumption (public consumption directly; 
private consumption indirectly by fiscal pressure); promoting investment (public investment directly; 
private investment by lowering interest rates); stabilizing the exchange rate (to avoid inflationary 
pressures; however, when the pound sterling ceased to be convertible in September 1931, the 
Portuguese currency kept pace with the pound, to avoid loss of competitivity, and thus Portugal 
remained an informal member of the sterling area until the outbreak of the Second World War). This 
may be reckoned as a success, as the rather good performance of Portuguese gross domestic 
product, balance of payments and public accounts during the 1930s show. 
 
 
4. Conclusion: lessons from history? 
 
The episodes evoked in the preceding pages prove that stabilization processes are possible in 
the Portuguese economy. They also prove that the way things are done matters, at least from an 
economic and financial point of view. 
As a matter of fact, the solutions adopted for the crisis of the early 1890s, both in a short-term 
and a long-term perspective, failed to keep the Portuguese economy on a development track in 
spite of the favourable international background provided by the so-called belle époque; the efforts 
to restore monetary normalcy and access to capital markets were too slow to produce results, 
because of internal political reasons, as explained above; as a consequence, nothing was 
consolidated until the First World War made it impossible any way back. On the contrary, the fiscal 
consolidation and monetary stabilization of the mid-1920s paved the way for a rather good 
economic performance during the interwar period, in spite of the problems raised by the 
international background of the 1920s and 1930s;21 moreover, it may be argued that it created the 
preconditions for the definitive entry of the Portuguese economy in the process of modern economic 
growth after the Second World War. 
                                                      








However, from a political point of view, it is difficult to choose from the perspective of the 
political regimes that existed at the time of the outbreak of crises. Both the monarchic regime that 
existed in the early 1890s and the republican regime that existed in the early 1920s disappeared in 
the wake of the efforts to solve the problems. Monarchy was replaced in 1910 by a liberal 
democratic Republic, which was overthrown in turn by the Army in 1926. Curiously, both the 
Republic of the second decade of the 20th century and the military dictatorship of the mid-1920s 
were able to conclude the work started by their predecessors, and profit from such a conclusion. 
To sum up: may be nearly one century later, Portugal will be able to repeat the financial 
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Table 1 – Public accounts and public debt 
 









or deficit (-) 
Public debt 
at the end 
of the year 
Foreign public 
debt at the end 
of the year 
1880-1881 33 22 3 - 8 417 173 
1881-1882 36 25 4 - 7 433 208 
1882-1883 33 23 4 - 6 444 208 
1883-1884 34 25 4 - 5 441 210 
1884-1885 39 26 4 - 8 489 245 
1885-1886 40 27 4 - 9 494 244 
1886-1887 40 29 5 - 7 502 237 
1887-1888 43 32 5 - 7 513 221 
1888-1889 49 32 6 - 12 526 284 
1889-1890 52 32 6 - 14 539 294 
1890-1891 49 33 6 - 11 583 341 
1891-1892 53 32 5 - 15 587 341 
1892-1893 46 35 5 - 5 625 328 
1893-1894 44 39 5 + 0 600 300 
1894-1895 45 38 5 - 1 599 299 
1895-1896 48 43 7 + 2 610 314 
1896-1897 54 40 7 - 7 671 314 
1897-1898 54 40 7 - 7 665 315 
1898-1899 52 41 7 - 4 615 309 
1899-1900 57 44 5 - 7 665 309 
1900-1901 51 45 7 + 1 695 314 
1901-1902 52 43 6 - 3 683 309 
1902-1903 54 45 6 - 3 594 212 
1903-1904 55 47 6 - 2 610 215 
1904-1905 55 48 8 + 0 646 211 
1905-1906 57 48 8 - 0 649 215 
1906-1907 57 47 8 - 1 628 213 
1907-1908 70 50 17 - 4 627 214 
















or deficit (-) 
Public debt 
at the end 
of the year 
Foreign public 
debt at the end 
of the year 
1909-1910 69 51 18 - 1 670 201 
1910-1911 63 50 15 + 2 656 199 
1911-1912 64 51 10 - 3 661 198 
1912-1913 76 56 23 + 4 657 188 
1913-1914 62 53 16 + 7 648 182 
1914-1915 95 46 22 - 27 744 248 
1915-1916 134 47 39 - 48 806 280 
1916-1917 144 50 39 - 56 883 302 
1917-1918 179 49 43 - 87 994 319 
1918-1919 271 64 37 - 170 1 164 351 
1919-1920 347 88 71 - 188 1 553 609 
1920-1921 418 131 88 - 199 2 860 1 574 
1921-1922 550 173 147 - 230 4 002 2 458 
1922-1923 1 187 321 216 - 649 6 963 4 965 
1923-1924 1 171 555 215 - 401 8 048 5 492 
1924-1925 1 428 734 428 - 266 8 401 5 412 
1925-1926 1 508 815 284 - 409 8 900 5 354 
1926-1927 1 821 907 280 - 634 9 365 5 270 
1927-1928 1 667 1 069 442 - 155 9 573 5 300 
1928-1929 1 757 1 444 604 + 291 9 547 5 305 
1929-1930 1 862 1 549 396 + 83 9 432 5 256 
1930-1931 1 730 1 439 481 + 190 9 583 5 833 
1931-1932 1 845 1 482 412 + 49 9 867 5 857 
1932-1933 1 931 1 497 423 - 11 7 394 3 330 
1933-1934 1 973 1 548 435 + 10 7 270 3 322 
1934-1935 2 879 2 426 610 + 157 7 208 3 271 
1936 1 984 1 612 401 + 29 7 186 3 245 
1937 2 035 1 663 475 + 104 7 238 3 225 
1938 2 257 1 752 498 - 7 7 200 3 183 
1939 2 357 1 684 485 - 188 7 154 3 099 
 
Source: Valério, 2001. 







Note – Fiscal years from 1880-1881 to 1933-1934 began on 1 July of each civil year and ended on 30 
June of the following civil year; the fiscal year 1934-1935 began on 1 July 1934 and ended on 

























prices – thousand 
contos) 
Per capita gross 
domestic product 
(1914 prices – 
escudos) 
1880 - 8 - 3 4.500 80 406 108 
1881 - 13 - 3 4.500 82 411 106 
1882 - 11 - 1 4.500 83 421 106 
1883 - 8 - 3 4.500 79 413 109 
1884 - 10 - 3 4.500 73 431 121 
1885 - 10 - 3 4.500 70 441 128 
1886 - 11 - 9 4.500 72 472 132 
1887 - 16 - 4 4.500 70 462 132 
1888 - 15 - 6 4.500 70 490 139 
1889 - 18 - 8 4.500 76 510 132 
1890 - 23 - 4 4.500 86 510 116 
1891 - 18 + 26 4.832 83 497 117 
1892 - 6 + 4 5.735 85 493 112 
1893 - 15 + 6 5.600 87 503 111 
1894 - 12 + 3 5.790 89 502 107 
1895 - 13 0 5.698 84 538 121 
1896 - 13 + 4 5.853 85 551 122 
1897 - 13 + 2 6.575 92 557 114 
1898 - 18 - 1 7.108 96 597 116 
























prices – thousand 
contos) 
Per capita gross 
domestic product 
(1914 prices – 
escudos) 
1900 - 29 + 2 6.320 91 639 129 
1901 - 29 + 1 6.382 90 616 125 
1902 - 27 + 0 5.722 87 613 127 
1903 - 28 + 0 5.581 90 643 127 
1904 - 31 + 2 5.413 96 658 121 
1905 - 32 - 2 4.793 95 649 119 
1906 - 30 + 2 4.582 95 659 120 
1907 - 31 + 0 4.642 95 675 123 
1908 - 39 + 1 5.199 96 694 124 
1909 - 34 - 4 5.185 97 702 123 
1910 - 34 + 4 4.895 93 732 133 
1911 - 34 - 4 4.889 99 714 120 
1912 - 40 - 2 4.974 98 756 128 
1913 - 54 + 3 5.235 101 786 130 
1914 - 42 -1 5.663 100 711 117 
1915 - 42 - 2 6.746 112 840 123 
1916 - 73 0 7.032 137 1 141 135 
1917 - 82 - 1 7.726 162 1 211 121 
1918 - 95 - 2 7.901 293 1 600 89 
1919 - 122 + 1 8.196 335 2 122 104 
1920 - 469 - 1 18.329 580 3 881 110 
1921 - 708 - 1 39.384 909 4 829 86 
1922 - 808 0 65.084 1 099 8 049 118 
1923 - 1 545 0 109.714 1 726 12 903 119 
1924 - 2 009 - 28 133.950 2 399 16 958 111 
1925 - 1 622 - 8 99.210 2 306 17 084 115 
1926 - 1 606 - 2 94.770 2 208 17 139 119 
1927 - 1 940 + 7 108.360 2 371 18 262 117 
1928 - 1 650 + 5 108.250 2 269 20 690 137 
1929 - 1 456 + 1 108.250 2 361 21 667 136 
1930 - 1 461 - 1 108.250 2 243 20 818 136 
























prices – thousand 
contos) 
Per capita gross 
domestic product 
(1914 prices – 
escudos) 
1932 - 916 - 265 110.061 1 949 18 354 134 
1933 - 1 103 - 106 109.103 1 948 19 536 141 
1934 - 1 056 + 15 110.453 1 968 20 361 144 
1935 - 1 371 + 69 110.363 1 972 21 153 147 
1936 - 968 + 210 110.377 2 022 21 134 142 
1937 - 1 151 - 231 110.375 2 102 22 935 146 
1938 - 1 161 + 165 110.385 2 037 23 329 151 
1939 - 741 - 391 110.270 1 918 23 481 159 
 
Source: Valério, 2001, except for gross domestic product and per capita gross domestic product, 
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